The common perception that Montesquieu is not a major theorist of federalism is due both to the peripheral nature of his account of confederate republics and his praise of the unitary British Constitution in the Spirit of the Laws. This study challenges this view by arguing that, despite his endorsement of the separation of powers, Montesquieu had serious reservations about England's highly centralized system of parliamentary sovereignty. Moreover, his most significant reflections on federalism were not contained in his brief treatment of confederate republics, but rather in his lengthy consideration of Gothic constitutionalism. I conclude that Montesquieu's complex constitutional theory involves two distinct dimensions including both the separation of powers exemplified in England and the federal principles in the decentralized Gothic system of medieval France.
Montesquieu is seldom seen as an important theorist of federalism. The reasons for this assessment appear to be twofold. First, his brief account of confederate republics in the Spirit of the Laws is typically interpreted to be peripheral to the aim of the work as a whole, and simply a reflection on the problematic political possibilities available to small classical republics with little purchase for large states and modern notions of sovereignty (Wolfe 1977, 427-445; Nelson 1987, 112) . 1 Second, many commentators have long followed the lead of no less an authority on federalism than James Madison, who identified the unitary British Constitution with its separation of powers as the apogee of Montesquieu's thinking, the ''perfect model'' from which he drew all ''the principles and rules'' of government (Pangle 1973, 113-117; Hulliung 1976, 212; Cohler 1988, 7; Madison et al. 2001, 250; MacDonald 2003, 126-129) . 2 By the combined logic of these two premises,
Montesquieu is viewed to have held the federal principle as a largely outdated, and in key respects defective, feature of classical republican government that has been clearly surpassed by the modern English commercial republic.
This study challenges this common reading of Montesquieu in two major respects. First, it will argue that while Montesquieu's praise of the English balanced constitution as the one government in the world that ''has political liberty for its direct purpose'' has received considerable attention, his serious reservations about the concentration of power in England's highly centralized political system have typically passed unnoticed.
3 I propose that for Montesquieu the British system of parliamentary sovereignty is a laudable, but in important respects, defective constitutional model that fails to guarantee moderate government. Second, this study argues that commentators have generally sought Montesquieu's theory of federalism in the wrong places. I will suggest that his most significant reflections on federalism were not contained in his brief treatment of confederate republics, but rather in the lengthy discussion of Gothic constitutionalism that concludes the Spirit of the Laws. 4 By this account, Gothic constitutionalism involves two principal features: the guiding principle of balanced power and the gradual evolution from a simple form of representative government to a complex feudal system of moderate monarchy with intermediate institutions and territorially divided power. In this discussion, Montesquieu eschews the term ''federalism'' traditionally associated with small republics, but in the process of illuminating the principles of decentralization underlying the Gothic system he limns the features of a recognizably federal division of power. While Montesquieu praises the English judiciary and regional representation in the lower house as the preservation of some aspects of the Gothic original, he mourns the loss in England and France of the intermediary regional institutions that were once distinctive features of the Gothic Constitution. It is in his detailed treatment of medieval France that Montesquieu brings to the fore a largely forgotten constitutional system in which the relationship between the center and the periphery was ideally one of ongoing accommodation between the primary local communities and the central government. Montesquieu presents the federal principles embedded in the decentralized Gothic Constitution as a vital supplement to the separation of powers, and a corrective to the problem of concentrated power in modern England and France.
Thus, far from being merely a peripheral interest, federalism is a pivotal element of Montesquieu's constitutional theory. I will argue that Montesquieu offers Anglo-Gothic constitutionalism as a set of distinct, but potentially overlapping principles for diffusion of power including both the English separation of powers in the national government and the Gothic principle of territorially divided power and decentralized authority between the center and the regions exemplified in medieval France. The lessons of Anglo-Gothic constitutionalism for legislators include recognizing that securing moderate government may require both the horizontal separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the national government and a further vertical division of power between the compound central government, on one hand, and regional assemblies, on the other. Montesquieu's account of the British separation of powers points beyond itself to reflection on the possibility of the further federal decentralization of power in the Gothic system of divided sovereignty.
This article is divided into four sections. The first section examines the relation between Montesquieu's account of the British Constitution and the regime typology he presents in the opening books of the Spirit of the Laws. It argues that Montesquieu's praise of the English separation of powers signifies both his idea of one of the key elements of good government and his departure from traditional regime analysis, which he believed tends to distort complex political conditions by focusing exclusively on the character of the sovereign element, rather than the organization and distribution of the functions and powers of government. The second section considers Montesquieu's notion of constitutional moderation, which rested on the distinction between the exercise of government, on one hand, and the limits on political power imposed by constitutional or fundamental law, on the other. It will be shown that, despite the salutary separation of powers, British parliamentary sovereignty failed to guarantee Montesquieu's requirements for moderate government.
Section three examines Montesquieu's account of the historical development of the British Constitution and the nation's gradual departure from its Gothic original. It will suggest that he found the roots of the nation's latent constitutional problems in the process of centralization produced by the English Civil War and the Henrician religious reformation. The final section considers the federal supplement to British constitutionalism implicit in Montesquieu's analysis of the Gothic origins of French constitutional history. The Anglo-Gothic principles of horizontal separation and vertical division of power suggest possibilities for moderate government that could be adapted to diverse conditions by combining elements of the separation of powers in the central government with the creation or revivification of sub-national institutions in a flexible version of federalism not only directed to, but also capable of securing, political liberty. This study concludes with a brief consideration of Montesquieu's legacy and the varied impact of his constitutional and federal theory on political thinkers and reformers in England, America, and France.
Britain and the Classification of Regimes
The first introduction to the issue of regimes in the Spirit of the Laws occurs in Montesquieu's typology of regimes in Part I. He defines a regime as the combination of a certain nature or ''particular structure'' and the distinct principle or ''human passions that set it in motion'' (3.1.21). The essence of law, he claims, lies in the ''necessary relations deriving from the nature of things'' (1.1.3).
As such, the multiplicity of regime types including aristocratic and democratic republicanism, monarchy, and despotism signifies the inherent variety derivative from the necessary relation of things. Necessity is not identical with uniformity. Montesquieu contrasts the variety implicit in the distinct natures of these regime types with the underlying unity suggested by what he calls the ''laws of nature'' (1.2.6) . These laws are in some sense universal inasmuch as they derive from ''the constitution of our being'' (1.2.6). These natural laws include the desire for peace, the need for physical nourishment, the attractions of conjugal union, and the desire to live in larger society with others. While Montesquieu's first two laws of nature parallel the Hobbesian primacy of self-preservation, the latter two indicate that society broadly conceived is not simply instrumental to self-preservation. According to Montesquieu, self-preservation must inform and direct any adequate understanding of the human desire for society, but political phenomena are not simply reducible to these preservationist concerns.
According to Montesquieu's version of regime typology, the nature of regimes derives from ''the idea of them held by the least educated of men'' (les hommes les moins instruits) (2.1.10) . By this simple logic, the form of government is practically identical to who rules (one, few or many) and under what conditions this rule is exercised. Republicanism involves democratic rule by the people as a body or aristocratic government of a part of the people, monarchy is rule of one by ''fixed and established laws'' in concert with ''intermediary'' institutions, and despotism is rule of one ''without law and without rule'' (2.1.10). The fundamental laws that flow from each of these species of rule relate to the essential issue of who or what body constitutes the sovereign power. The principles that animate these regimes and move their structures are as distinctive as their natures. Montesquieu claims that the principle of monarchy is honor and despotism is fear, whereas democracy is love of equality and aristocracy is moderation. Logically the corruption of each of these regimes occurs when their principles deteriorate and lose their potency.
The corruption of the regimes points to what Montesquieu takes to be the primary defects in these systems of rule. He unequivocally rejects despotism since its routinized terrorism undermines the most basic human desire for a modicum of physical and psychological well-being: ''One cannot speak of these monstrous governments without shuddering'' (3.9.28). The democracy of the ancient polis produced virtues of patriotism and self-sacrifice that ''astonish'' the ''small souls'' of modern people (4.4.35) , but required ''very painful'' self-renunciation supported by a ''ferocious'' civic education and the leveling of property (4.5.35, 4.8.11) . Montesquieu contrasts the rigor of republican ''political virtue'' with what he identifies as the ''false honor '' of monarchies (3.7.27) , the latter of which is reducible to a form of class-based self-interest. The noble will defend the privileges of his caste against royal intrusion out of a sense of his own grandeur, but he has no idea of the nation as such (Durkheim 1965, 30; cf. Krause 2002, ch. 2; MacDonald 2003, 116-120) . The primary defect of monarchy involves the tendency for the concentration of power into the person of the crown: ''A monarchy is ruined when the prince, referring everything to himself exclusively, reduces the state to its capital, the capital to the court, and the court to his person alone'' (8.6.117 ). Montesquieu suggests that this tendency is a latent possibility woven into the very fabric of monarchy, for in a monarchy ''the prince is the source of all political and civil power'' (2.4.17) . Monarchy requires a personal sovereign to be the institutional glue holding the society together.
In contrast, the primary defect of republicanism has to do with security. Montesquieu argues that in order to maintain the citizen's intense personal attachment to the public good, republics must be very small (8.16.124 ). However, their size makes republics vulnerable to conquest by the large, warlike monarchies, and despotisms that predominate in the international sphere. It is in this context that Montesquieu offers his first brief reflections on federalism in the Spirit of the Laws. The ''confederate republic'' (la république fédérative) emerges as the institutional device through which several small republics unite in a form of military alliance to provide for their mutual security. In principle, the confederate republic combines the virtue of republican self-government with the military ''advantages of large monarchies'' through the ''force of association'' (9.1.132). However, for Montesquieu the primary defect of this form of quasifederal association is the immense difficulty in maintaining sufficient centralization for defensive purposes without destroying the basis for political virtue and republican self-government in the member states (Wolfe 1977, 444) . 5 Building as it does on fiercely independent-minded small republics, the confederate republic is less a single people than a ''society of societies'' (9.1.131) that typically lacks internal coherence and unity. Montesquieu's discussion of confederate republics suggests that the federal principle has only a limited and problematic application within the rubric of traditional republican regime analysis. Montesquieu's analytic approach to England in Book 11 in Part II differs markedly from the pattern set by the earlier typology. To start, we are never told the nature of the English regime, nor does he identify any single principle or primary human passion that moves it. In England, ''all the passions are free' ' (19.27.325) . Rather than any single nature or passion, Montesquieu identifies a specific object to which the English regime is directed and that is ''political liberty'' (11.5.156) . He defines political liberty as ''that tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security . . . such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen'' (11.6.157) . With this self-regarding notion of liberty, Montesquieu not only clearly contrasts political liberty with the self-renunciation involved in the classical idea of political virtue, he also corrects the apparently natural tendency of people to ascribe ''the name of liberty'' to any government that is consistent with their customs or inclinations (11.2.155) . Political liberty as it exists in England is not to be confused with ''the power of the people,'' but rather involves the individual's ''power to do what one should want to do'' (i.e., everything the laws permit) and ''in no way being constrained to do what one should not want to do'' (11.3.155) . In this identification of political liberty exclusively with early modern Britain, Montesquieu indicates his sense of how little political liberty has historically been understood.
The most fundamental structural feature of the regime directed to political liberty is the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government. Whereas the classical republics relied on strict civic education to counteract the natural temptation to use public power for private or factional interests, the British Constitution resembles monarchy inasmuch as it relies not on virtue, but rather on a form of self-interest attached to institutional design (Pangle 1973, 102) . The separation of powers between a bicameral legislature, a hereditary executive, and an independent judiciary is not a strict separation, but rather a system of checks and balances wherein the various bodies interact with and limit each other (Vile 1998, 94; Madison et al. 2001, 250-252; Stewart 2004, 202) . In practice, each branch with its own prerogatives and source of authority will be ''forced to move in concert'' with the others ''by the necessary motion of things'' (11.6.164) .
By means of this institutional complexity, the English system, at least in theory, reduces the potential for tyrannical caprice and abuse of power, thus affording the citizen some reasonable grounds for the ''tranquility of spirit'' produced by the confidence one has in one's security. In contrast to earlier thinkers, most notably Locke, who confined the separation of powers to the division of the legislative and executive (Locke 1988, sec. 91, 143) , Montesquieu highlights the additional significance of the independent English judiciary as a protection for due process and for softening the application of laws that he claims are already among the most enlightened in the world. 6 He praises in particular the English custom of jury trials by which ''the power of judging, so terrible among men, being attached neither to a certain state nor to a certain profession, becomes, so to speak, invisible, and null'' (11.6.158) . The individual feeling of security from oppressive political power is heightened considerably, Montesquieu suggests, by the refraction of the awesome prosecutorial power of the state through the tribunals of judgment by one's peers. How then are we meant to understand the relation between Montesquieu's account of the British Constitution and his regime typology in Part I? In one sense, the singularity of England indicates that the regime types exemplify traditional models of government that do not adequately institutionalize the means to secure political liberty because none of them articulate the clear separation of powers or functions that we see in England. By making personal security its focus, the English regime embodies one of the most basic natural law imperatives regarding individual well-being. In its reliance on institutional complexity and the universal passion for security, rather than the rigorous education, rarified principles, and the concern for the character of the sovereign element that seems to be intrinsic to the traditional regime types, Montesquieu's England signifies a novel way to approach and secure laudable goals by political means.
In another sense, however, Montesquieu's account of the British Constitution represents an implicit critique of the very model of regime analysis he employed in Part I. While he admits that the traditional regime types are to some extent theoretical abstractions, the obvious attractiveness of the English model indicates that Montesquieu finds something problematic in a mode of analysis rooted in the perspective of ''the least educated of men'' (2.1.10). The tendency for typology to identify the character of the sovereign, and in a sense most visible, element in the body politic as the principle of intelligibility distinguishing the distinct types is on its face, he suggests, a seriously misleading methodology. Montesquieu illustrates that not only is England difficult, or even impossible, to classify under the rubric of traditional regime typology, but also that many actual historical regimes involve some measure of mixture (6.3.76) or only roughly approximate a regime type that admits of many degrees of perfection (3.11.30). The compound nature of sovereignty in England is thus its most distinctive constitutional feature.
Moderation and the Problem of England
Through the course of the account of the British Constitution it becomes apparent that moderation is Montesquieu's constitutional principle par excellence. The distinction between moderate and nonmoderate government replaces the distinction between one-man rule and republicanism as the primary conceptual division among regimes (Mansfield 1989, 229) . The British Constitution seems to exemplify Montesquieu's claim that in moderate government ''one must combine powers, regulate them, temper them, make them act; one must give one power a ballast, so to speak, to put it in a position to resist another'' (5.14.63). This ''masterpiece of legislation'' that ''chance rarely produces and prudence is rarely allowed to produce'' (5. 14.63; 8.8.118 ) is the characteristic of any form of government in which the sovereign power is constrained by law or institutional design.
Moderation as a constitutional principle contains two distinct features: the horizontal separation of powers among the functions of government and the vertical division of power among several layers of authority. With regard to the horizontal separation of powers exemplified by England, Montesquieu observes that even if the executive and legislative are united as in the case of ''most kingdoms of Europe,'' the government may still be moderate so long as the judicial power is left to the people. Political liberty and the feeling of physical security for the individual is more settled in such monarchies than in either Turkish despotism or the Italian republics in which all three powers are exercised by the same body (11.6.157) . Not only does Montesquieu avoid directly linking moderation and republicanism, he implies that in many cases something besides the separation of powers, a further diffusion of power, may also provide support for moderation.
The second feature of moderation, the division of power among layers of authority, Montesquieu associates quite explicitly with monarchy rather than republicanism. The primary virtue of monarchy is that it requires that the sovereign exercise rule at least in part through ''several orders dependent on the constitution'' (5.11.57). These subordinate, intermediary institutions comprise the constitution along with the sovereign power. Thus, at least one aspect of moderation points to some kind of fundamental or constitutional authority superintending or limiting the law making power. The monarchical idea of rule by ''fixed and established laws'' (2.1.10) with layers of jurisdiction reflects this element of Montesquieu's understanding of what a constitution means; namely, an assemblage of laws, institutions, and customs that compose the general system according to which a nation has historically been governed. The notional distinction between government or rule, on one hand, and constitutional or fundamental laws and structures, on the other, is, according to Montesquieu, no less a part of the moderation than the separation of powers.
It is in this respect that the deficiencies in British constitutionalism come to light. On one hand, his admittedly idealized account is clearly intended to highlight the salutary features of the English separation of powers with an independent judiciary and a compound national legislature of king, lords and commons. 7 On the other hand, Montesquieu's reservations about the English model of parliamentary sovereignty have to do with the relatively few checks on parliamentary authority. He claims that if the English were ever to lose their liberty, they would be ''one of the most enslaved peoples on earth'' (2.4.19) . In order to understand Montesquieu's view of the latent dangers underlying the British Constitution, we need to consider the features of parliamentary sovereignty that animate this concern.
Montesquieu's identification of England as ''a nation where the republic hides under the form of monarchy'' (5.19.70) expresses his recognition that it is not a genuine monarchy because parliament has abolished all ''the prerogatives of the lords, clergy, nobility, and towns'' that once formed the feudal monarchy (2.4.18) . While parliament itself forms a horizontal balance of powers, the establishment of parliamentary sovereignty effectively nullified the feudal division of power among layers of authority by absorbing the functions of the ''intermediary powers'' of the monarchy into the folds of an omnicompetent national legislature. Montesquieu's meaning when he warns of the potential for English slavery is that in lieu of any intermediary or subordinate bodies to balance the power of the central government, should parliament itself become corrupted, then ipso facto the English polity would be institutionally defenseless and left with no legal means to resist tyranny. In England, the constitution is for all intents and purposes indistinguishable from parliamentary rule.
The awareness of the potential danger to liberty posed by centralized parliamentary power pervades Montesquieu's analysis of practically every aspect of English political life. For example, while he praises the English practice of juries and due process for securing the rights of individuals, Montesquieu describes this as a form of protection that must be understood as operating almost exclusively at the trial level. He emphasizes that the English define the scope of judicial interpretation very narrowly by insisting ''judgments should be fixed to such a degree that they are never anything but a precise text of the law'' (11.6.158) . Clearly Montesquieu does not envision in England anything even approaching the American practice of judicial review to declare statutes unconstitutional (Stoner 1992, 152; Tuckness 2002, 151-153) . 8 By emphasizing the limited scope of English judicial power constitutionally speaking, Montesquieu only accentuates the degree to which the courts were subject to legislative supremacy. Some commentators suggest that Montesquieu sees partisanship supplying the institutional balance moderating parliamentary sovereignty (Manent 1994, 61; Rahe 2001, 88-90) . Clearly Montesquieu attaches great significance to partisanship as a stabilizing force in British politics. In the struggle for dominance between the ''two visible powers'' of the government, the legislative, and the executive, he sees the emergence of a fluid party system according to which the partisans who identify their interests with one of the branches would balance the power of the other branch: ''As these parties are made up of freemen, if one party gained too much, the effect of liberty would be to lower it while the citizens come and raise up the other party like hands rescuing a body' ' (19.27.326) . Thus the parties in Britain supply societal support for the institutional separation of powers as vigilant citizens ''uneasy'' (inquiet) in their freedom and suspicious of power have incentive to work collectively to prevent the usurpation of power by one or the other branch (19.27.326). 9 Ultimately it is the self-interested passions of the people that give the institutional checks on power their vitality. The connection between partisanship and institutional stability is, however, by no means necessary in Montesquieu's account. A peculiar feature of the English party system to which he alludes is that it operates in the context of a broad consensus about the nature of the constitution. The English factions Montesquieu describes are the eighteenth-century parties of economic interests, rather than the parties of ideological and theological principle that gave prior English history its colorful and turbulent tenor. 10 With oblique reference to the Glorious Revolution, Montesquieu observes that the modern parties in England share a common origin in the decision of the various factions in the country to unite in opposition to Stuart pretensions ''to overthrow the fundamental laws' ' (19.27.326) . Despite their differences in other regards over government policy, these parties agree on the basic premise of parliamentary sovereignty grounding the revolution settlement (Ward 2004, 318-319) . If we were to assume the absence of this fundamental agreement on the basic principle of legitimacy animating the British Constitution, this form of partisanship would be much more ominous and more deeply divisive than the relatively mild form of partisanship Montesquieu describes. At the very least, one can conclude that the partisan support for constitutional government in Britain rested on a particular, and perhaps unusually innocuous, form of partisanship contingent to some extent on specific historical factors. The great danger Montesquieu clearly identifies in the English party system has to do with the potential for corruption of parliament. He practically concludes his account of the British Constitution with the observation that: ''This state will perish when legislative power is more corrupt than executive power'' (11.6.166) . The source of the danger is that in a quasi-republican system such as Britain the legislative power attracts many partisans because it has a natural and palpable connection to the public, especially the Commons who act as its elected representatives. 11 However, in order to preserve some measure of independence the hereditary executive requires, in Montesquieu's view, that many lucrative posts and commissions be at its disposal as a means to acquire supporters (19.27.325).
He suggests that the long-term effects of this patronage power may ultimately be corrosive to legislative independence. If the executive is too weak, it cannot play its role in resisting legislative majority faction. If, on the other hand, it is too strong, the executive has, and presumably would use, these tools to undermine the integrity of the representative branch. Should the executive ever be in a position to use the largesse at its disposal to bribe or intimidate legislators in a systematic and extensive fashion, the separation of powers would implode. While Montesquieu indicated that English liberty would be secure as long as ''great fortunes are not drawn from military employment and as long as those drawn from civil employment remain moderate,'' 12 he is clear that it is more a matter of public vigilance against excessive executive influence than an automatically self-correcting feature of the separation of powers. The problem of corruption in England relates back to the unregulated nature of parliamentary sovereignty. Any major change in the character or composition of parliament has the potential to alter the constitution itself. The long-term danger Montesquieu foresees involves the corruption caused by factions within the government as the constitutional consensus underlying the Glorious Revolution gradually unravels under the strains caused by the party struggle for supremacy. The very possibility of the formation of an anti-constitutional party centered on the executive and dedicated to overthrowing the constitutional balance indicates the problem in a horizontal system of divided power that offers no countervailing territorially divided powers to balance that of the national government. The tendency for parliamentary government to collapse administration and constitution, or normal statute and fundamental law is exacerbated dramatically when the parliamentary balance of power is itself attenuated. Despite the majesty of its exquisite separation of powers and the many factors supporting moderation in its customs and laws, Montesquieu detects latent dangers to English liberty.
The Historical Roots of the British Constitution
Montesquieu's account of the English government and society reveals his assessment of both the achievements and the defects of the system of parliamentary sovereignty. This account does not, however, explain the historical developments that produced the separation of powers or the highly centralized authority of parliament. From whence did this remarkable government spring, and what does Montesquieu suggest can be learned about the art of legislation from its provenance?
While as a general principle Montesquieu considers a nation's history as an important element in its political formation, he offers surprisingly little treatment of English history in the Spirit of the Laws. Certainly, he provides much less analysis in regard to English history than he does with respect to ancient Rome or his own native France, arguably the two other most prominent nations in the work (Krause 2003, 255-260) . What can be said, however, is that Montesquieu offers a few underlying general causes that shaped the direction of English political history. The fundamental English historical experience has been the gradual dismantling of the feudal Gothic Constitution and its replacement with a system of parliamentary sovereignty. The parliamentary separation of powers emerged as an institutional arrangement of balanced authority transposed in important respects over the vestiges of England's ancient constitution. The problems in the modern separation of powers such as the weakened nobility and the potentiality for executive as well as legislative tyranny are evidence of the difficulty in transforming a political order based on historical local and class privileges into an institutional arrangement devised to balance the various powers or functions of the central government. It is in light of this difficulty that Montesquieu's reflections on the loss of crucial features of the Gothic decentralized system of authority acquire genuine salience both for England in particular and for his conception of the art of legislation more generally.
For Montesquieu, the British Constitution originated in the mists of ancient Anglo-Saxon history. Drawing on the evidence of Tacitus, Montesquieu discovers the precursor to parliament in the ancient German system of consultation between the prince and the assembled people on matters of public concern: ''This fine system was found in the forests'' (11.6.166) . He praises the regional basis of representation in the lower house as one of the salutary legacies of England's Gothic origins (11.6.159) . However, in addition to a national legislative body, the Gothic system also featured a complex socio-political structure in which the power of the crown was mediated through ''the prerogatives of the nobility and the clergy'' (11.8.167 ). Montesquieu indicates that in the Gothic Constitution which provided the foundation of the feudal ''monarchies that we know,'' the ''three powers are not distributed'' on the separation of powers model of modern England (11.7.166, 11.8.167 ). While he identifies the establishment of representation as the ''origin of Gothic government among us'' (11.8.167 ), Montesquieu reveals that Gothic constitutionalism also involved a historical process by which power gradually devolved from the center to the ''intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers'' characteristic of feudalism (2.4.17) . For Montesquieu, Gothic constitutionalism as it evolved in both England and France was a well-tempered system in which the king, nobles and the people worked ''in concert' ' (11.8.167 ) both through representative national bodies and intermediary local institutions. The ''good'' original of Gothic representation with its spirit of localism ''had within itself the capacity to become better,'' and even ''the best kind of government men have been able to devise'' (11.8.167-8) .
It is the aspect of Gothic decentralization embodied in local and intermediary institutions that the English destroyed in the process of establishing parliamentary sovereignty (2.4.19) . The potential danger to liberty Montesquieu discovered in England was perhaps simply a conclusion deduced from the experience of his native France, which from the time of Louis XIV had undergone a process of acute centralization without the counterbalancing safety net, as it were, of the separation of powers within the national government. 13 Cardinal
Richelieu, the architect of the Bourbon centralization policy, Montesquieu accuses of having systematically ''degraded'' the intermediate orders of the state: ''Even if this man's heart was not filled with despotism, his head was'' (5.10.56). In England, in contrast, the centralization process had no single identifiable progenitor, but rather two distinct general historical causes in the Civil War and the Reformation. Montesquieu relates that the English Civil War of the seventeenth-century dealt a severe blow to key Gothic elements of the ancient constitution for several reasons. First, it led to the destruction of England's feudal nobility. He claims: ''The English nobility was buried with Charles I in the debris of the throne'' (8.9.118). The demise of the English nobility with the royalist cause in the 1640's ensured that the nation reached a constitutional point of no return and could never again be a genuine monarchy as Montesquieu defines it: ''no monarch, no nobility, no nobility, no monarchy'' (2.4.18). The other major effect of the civil war was that it provided England with some experience of republican government. While Montesquieu scorns the ''fine spectacle'' presented by England's attempt to ''establish democracy'' (3.3.22), the lasting impact of this failed experiment was enormous. In one sense it signified the impossibility, or at least difficulty, of generating anything like the classical idea of public virtue in the modern age bitterly divided over sectarian differences.
14 In another sense, however, the English civil war marked a constitutional watershed after which, even though the nation soon formally returned to monarchy, the institutions were transformed profoundly. With the evisceration of the noble class and the intermediary and subordinate bodies that it supported, the focus of institutional power and prestige rested exclusively on the crown and the national parliament. Montesquieu implies that the English separation of powers is properly understood as an institutional response to this condition reflecting the need to balance the democratic and monarchical forces in the nation. This accommodation flows out of conditions produced by the drive for popular sovereignty that destroyed the last elements of England's feudal inheritance. Thus, parliamentary sovereignty with its separation of powers developed as an institutional check not only on the crown, but also on the popular forces that destroyed the monarchy in the civil war, and thus made the separation of powers possible in the first place (Manent 1994, 54) . The origin of Britain's quasi-republican separation of powers in a massive, if indirect, popular foundation indicates, for Montesquieu, both its greatest strength and its inherent vulnerability.
The second general dynamic of English constitutional development refers to the religious reformation inaugurated by Henry VIII. The major legacy of this event is twofold. First, Montesquieu argues that the anti-monarchical forces that produced the Civil War were set in motion by the Reformation as Henry's efforts to establish theological freedom from the papacy gave rise to an uncontrollable spirit of liberty in matters religious and political that eventually degenerated into the kind of fanaticism that plagued the civil war period (Carrithers 1986, 69) .
The other impact of the Henrician Reformation related to the establishment of the spirit of commerce in England. As a general matter Montesquieu associated the birth of modern commerce with the persecution of the Jews by the kings and princes who sought to despoil a defenseless and despised religious minority (21.20.388-9) . In response to their persecution and exclusion from most aspects of civil life, Montesquieu claims the Jews developed the fluid monetary and credit system that eventually became the foundation of modern commercial society in many parts of Europe. In England, however, Montesquieu identifies a different source for the birth of the spirit of commerce in the Protestant Reformation. He comments at some length:
When Henry VIII wanted to reform the Church of England, he destroyed the monks, a nation lazy in itself and one that maintained the laziness of others, because, as they practiced hospitality, an infinity of idle people, gentlemen, and bourgeois spent their lives running from monastery to monastery. He also took away the poorhouses where the common people found their sustenance, as gentlemen found theirs in the monasteries. After these changes, the spirit of commerce and industry became established in England (23.29.456 emphasis added).
The consequences of Henry's dissolution of the monasteries extended beyond the realm of socio-economics, and in effect laid the ground for a new political order. In a fine display of the law of unintended consequences, Montesquieu paints a portrait of English history in which a major royally inspired religious reform led to the theologico-political conflict that destroyed the feudal order in England and eventuated in a system of centralized parliamentary rule.
In the final analysis, Montesquieu's account of English history identifies both positive and negative aspects to the process of centralization that marked the modern period. For Montesquieu, the advantage is that the exercise of royal power in the Reformation eventually reduced religious conflict and the power of the Church by facilitating the growth of commerce. Moreover, the civil war originating in this religious reform produced the conditions necessary for a constitutional settlement of the separation of powers that could balance the popular and monarchical forces that had battled throughout modern English history. The negative aspect of English constitutional development was, in Montesquieu's view, the concentration of political power in parliament. English history put to the sword the intermediate and subordinate institutions that had channeled and moderated the power of the central government in the feudal period, much as the Bourbons and their ministers deracinated the local institutions that had preserved the French constitutional order for centuries. In lieu of a compound and representative national legislature, the effects of centralization in France would be especially grim. For Britain, Montesquieu suggests that in absence of the local institutions that once fortified their feudal order, even its admirable separation of powers and commercial spirit may not be enough to counteract the danger to liberty posed by the potential corruption of the central government. Montesquieu's solution to the fundamental modern problem of centralization lay in the new federal possibilities of the old Gothic Constitution.
Montesquieuian Federalism: Anglo-Gothic Constitutionalism
The lengthy treatment of French feudal law that concludes the Spirit of the Laws has long puzzled commentators. Compared to the relative paucity of English historical analysis, the account of French constitutional development is an embarrassment of riches. Yet Montesquieu offers no obvious connection between this detailed examination of obscure French legal history and the rest of the work. This has led some commentators to question the relevance of the closing books for the general purpose of the work as a whole (Levin 1936, 1; Oake 1948, 167-171) . Others see this ''historical jurisprudence'' solely in terms of Montesquieu's larger theory of law (Stoner 1992, 157-160; Carrese 2003, 82-102; Krause 2003, 255-260) . What has typically been ignored, however, is the federal dimension in Montesquieu's treatment of medieval France's vertical division of power among social classes and between the center and periphery, and this system's relation to the problem of centralized power in modernity. In the context of the larger design and purpose of the Spirit of the Laws, this model of vertical division of powers represents Montesquieu's federal supplement to the English model of horizontal separation of powers in the national government. Thus, the significance of the ''historical jurisprudence'' with which Montesquieu concludes the Spirit of the Laws extends beyond simply illuminating the particularities of French legal history, but rather acquires genuine theoretical salience as an effort to outline the framework of a federal system for modern governments.
The logical thrust of Montesquieu's treatment of the Gothic origins of French constitutionalism is twofold. First, this discussion reveals the Gothic roots of the highly praised English legal system with its historic concern for due process and its generally mild punishments. He clearly identifies the roots of the English principle of due process in the ''forests of Germany'' in which the various tribes employed a form of juries (28.27.571-2) and devised a system of rights of the accused intended ''to protect the criminal from the one he had offended' ' (30.20.651) . With respect to criminal law, the English clearly remained more faithful to their Gothic origins than the French as can be seen in the contrast Montesquieu draws between England's mild and France's draconian laws (Carrese 2003, 85-87) .
The second, and more important, aspect of Montesquieu's examination of French history relates to the decentralized distribution of power in the Gothic model. Here, in contrast, Montesquieu's presentation of English history shows a marked departure from Gothic constitutionalism in which the vertically balanced system of divided power was in some respects the very antithesis of parliamentary sovereignty. The complex feudal mélange of royal power, noble privilege, ecclesiastical law, and regional assemblies ''set various limits to empire'' and ''produced rule with an inclination to anarchy and anarchy with a tendency to order and harmony'' (30. 1.619, 28.12.547) . For Montesquieu, constitutionalism in the Gothic sense meant a variegated network of laws and overlapping jurisdictions embodying the general good of the nation as a whole.
The primary organizing principle of Gothic constitutionalism was the ''prodigious diversity'' of laws and local customs that Montesquieu praises as a form of rule deeply resistant to simplistic uniformity, a condition he dismisses as the hobgoblin of little minds (29.18.617). The salutary effect of this division of power and diffusion of authority through a system of regional institutions contributed not only to preserving social and political balance, but also to maintaining the distinction between the constitutional foundations, on one hand, and the legislative power of the national government, on the other, a distinction central to his understanding of moderate government. In order to appreciate the full significance of Montesquieu's treatment of the regional element of Gothic constitutionalism, we must briefly examine the way he conceived of its development in French history.
The genius of French constitutional development was, for Montesquieu, the tendency to balance, and check political power through various means. In contrast to the arch-royalist Abbé Dubos, who claimed that the French monarchs originated as the successors to the authority of the Roman Emperors (30.24.661-2), Montesquieu argues that from its very beginning the French monarchy was in vital respects limited and elective (Ellis 1989, 665-700) . The Franks established a highly regulated monarchy in which ''the reciprocal rights of persons and of various nations living under the monarchy were agreed upon; the laws of each nation were given and even put into writing' ' (30.24.662) . Not only did the various tribes of the Frankish kingdom retain considerable autonomy in this quasi-federal system, they also played an integral role in electing the rulers (31. 16.695, 31.17.696) .
However, the primary cause of the diffusion of power in France was the proliferation of a multitude of intermediary institutions anchored in the territorially divided power and privileges of the nobility. One such institution was the ''justice of the lords'' according to which much of the administration of law in the kingdom fell to local nobles who acquired this right through patrimonial inheritance (30.20.653, 30.21.656) . By this right, the ''general assembly'' of the provinces composed of local nobility was entrusted to regularize the ''written and unwritten usages of each place'' and to apply the laws (28.45.601). The impact of this institution was to structure the French legal system on the basis of overlapping and conjoint jurisdictions in which the crown and the nobility, the center and the regions shared power. Montesquieu claims, whether king, count or lord ''they never judged alone' ' (30.18.645 ). An additional check on monarchical power was the establishment of the local mayoralties; elective offices to which Montesquieu ascribes much of the real power in the Frankish kingdom (31.3.677, 31.6.679), and which he maintains reflected a regionally based source of power ''independent of monarchy'' (31. 1.670-1) .
The heart of the old French Constitution, however, lay in the crucial role the nobility played in the Gothic system of balanced power and divided sovereignty. Montesquieu characterizes this complex order: ''In the French Constitution, the king, the nobility, and the clergy held all the power of the state in their hands'' (31.21.701). While he attaches relatively little significance to the clerical role in checking the centralizing aspirations of the monarch (31. 10.686, 4.3.34, 3.10.29-30) , Montesquieu sees the role of the nobility as enormous. The major historical development that ''changed the whole of the French political state,'' was the ninth-century concession made by the monarchs to the nobility by which ''every freeman could choose the lord he wanted, whether the king or another lord' ' (31.25.708) . With this act, and the alteration of property laws of fiefs that flowed from it, the provincial nobility acquired an independence from the crown that allowed it to support the complex system of balances and buffers checking the power of the central state:
Most of the lords who had formerly answered immediately to the crown [now] answered to it only mediately. These counts who had formerly rendered justice in the king's audiences . . . stood between the king and his freemen, and power was pushed back yet another degree (31.28.712 emphasis added).
Following this dramatic constriction of royal power, the conditions were set for the establishment of the feudal monarchy in which the provincial and county nobility not only absorbed much of the executive power of judging ''things dependent on civil right'' (11.6.156), but also gradually became the foundation for the ''depository of fundamental laws,'' the political bodies in the provinces that preserved the constitutional balance through the power to ''announce the laws when they are made and recall them when they are forgotten'' (2.4.19) . Unlike the English judges and juries who are subject to parliamentary supremacy, the French regional nobility played a vital role in both the judicial and legislative process by safeguarding certain fundamental laws from the potential predations of ordinary statute or royal edict (Stoner 1992, 157) . Montesquieu praises the fact that over time, the nobility even acquired a share of the traditional sovereign power over foreign relations and war through the law ''providing that the nobility would not be constrained to follow the princes to war except when it was a question of defending the state against foreign invasion'' (31.21.711). With this the putatively subordinate nobility were given a fundamental role in the exercise of war power traditionally seen as essential to the unity and integrity of the executive power.
Montesquieu's account of French constitutional development in the closing books of the Spirit of the Laws describes how the simple organization of the early Frankish government evolved over centuries into a highly complex monarchical state that preserved the balance of sovereign powers between the king and intermediary regional bodies (Cox 2001, 419) . While Montesquieu never calls the Gothic system ''federal,'' likely because of the traditional association of that term with republicanism (9.1-3), the medieval French constitution he considers in such detail was in essence a federal structure that required the central monarchy to share power with the regional nobility on matters executive, legislative, and judicial. The fruit of this vertical system of divided power was the permanent establishment of the provincial parlements following the reforms of Louis IX in the thirteenth century. These provincial assemblies of nobles served as the court of ''last resort on almost all the business of the kingdom' ' (28.39.593, 28.45.601; Kingston 1996, 97-130) . By serving as the chief depositories of law they also preserved a degree of local liberty and ensured that despite the many prerogatives of the crown, the monarch had no direct or unmediated authority over the people since this power having to ''pass through so many other powers and such great powers was checked or lost before reaching its goal'' (31.32.716). In the complex web of overlapping jurisdictions and competing competences that characterized the French feudal order, Montesquieu discovered a system of government that followed the ''natural empire'' of reason (28.38.591) by channeling authority through a series of intermediary institutions and local authorities. In this delicate balance of anarchy and harmony, Montesquieu found one of the key elements of moderate government.
Upon consideration of Montesquieu's assessment of the British Constitution in light of his treatment of French history, a number of important points become apparent. First, in crucial respects the power of the French monarchical government in the feudal period was considerably more limited, and in effect more moderate, than that of parliament in eighteenth-century England. While Montesquieu clearly admires the horizontal separation of powers in Britain's compound national legislature, he regrets the loss of the buffer to central authority produced by the demise of intermediary bodies. In the historical process of centralization that culminated in parliamentary sovereignty, the nation lost an important means to control power through the centrifugal pressures produced by relatively autonomous provincial and local institutions.
Second, implicit in Montesquieu's account of French history is an effort to improve upon the notion of federalism and division of power he first introduced briefly in the earlier discussion of confederate republics (9.1-3.131-3) . Montesquieu clearly believed that the traditional lexicon and established categories of federalism inherited from antiquity failed to capture the essence of the modern political phenomena he sought to examine. While the confederate republic and the Gothic Constitution share a common spirit of decentralization and compound vertical structures, they differ inasmuch as the Gothic principle of balancing power among classes and between the center and periphery assumes a historical idea of the nation and a degree of organic unity and subordination of autonomous powers practically impossible, or at least unlikely, in the ''society of societies'' characterizing Montesquieu's conception of the confederal republic (9.1.131).
Thus, it is in the feudal legacy of French constitutional history, rather than the classical or modern confederate republic, that Montesquieu discovers the basis for a new understanding of federalism in principles of territorial division of power that are adaptable to large, historically unified nations such as France and England.
Montesquieu's recovery of the federal principle of Gothic constitutionalism had obvious contemporary implications for both England and France. While Montesquieu lauds the British Constitution as an excellent distribution of the functions of government and a great improvement on the classical mixed regime, he feared that in lieu of the Gothic vertical checks provided by territorially divided power, the tendency of parliamentary rule to collapse the distinction between constitution and administration, and hence to efface constitutional limits on government power, will ultimately undermine most efforts to prevent the corruption of parliament (11.6.166) . 15 In Britain, despite the vibrancy of its representative institutions, the vigilance of its parties and an intrepid commercial spirit, the basic structural flaw in a system bereft of the advantages of decentralization meant that only the delicate balance of power within parliament separated the constitution of liberty from a most terrible slavery. For France, however, the situation is much direr. There the centralization project of Richelieu has almost deracinated the provincial checks on central authority and has accelerated the process by which the regional element in the historical French constitution has narrowed dangerously over time. With the incapacity of national institutions such as the superannuated Estates-General to supply significant horizontal checks and balances within the central government, the collapse of the vertical division of power in France threatens to be fatal for moderate constitutionalism in the nation. If the problem in Britain is that the constitution is indistinguishable from what the parliament says it is, then we may say that for Montesquieu the problem in absolutist France is that increasingly there is no constitution whatsoever.
Montesquieu's account of the relative strengths and weaknesses in British and French constitutionalism suggests the possibility of a hybrid constitutional model that fuses the modern British horizontal separation of powers with the older Gothic federal principle of a vertical division of power. The logical consequence of Montesquieu's invitation to consider the potentiality for moderate government in some combination of British and Gothic principles is the outline of a federal theory in which balanced government is supplemented by the additional checks on power supplied by a compound state comprised of numerous layers of subordinate, but relatively autonomous, political bodies. His praise for the decentralized Gothic Constitution and his admiration for the compound structure of Britain's parliament suggest that he is much less concerned about the logical problem of divided sovereignty and the purported need for sweeping executive power than many of his predecessors such as Hobbes and Bodin (Hobbes 1994, 115, 135, 216; Bodin 1962, 86, 91, 98) . For Montesquieu, the Gothic principle of the independence of dependent things and the British principle of the conjoint movement of conflicting forces by the ''necessary motion of things' ' (11.6.164 )-these twin mysteries of moderate constitutionalism-indicate, perhaps, not only the possibility, but also the desirability, of a system of divided sovereignty.
Conclusion
This study has argued that the dimensions of Montesquieu's complex constitutional theory in the Spirit of the Laws involved elements of both the English horizontal separation of powers and the Gothic or feudal vertical division of powers. This conception of moderate constitutionalism included an important federal dimension as Montesquieu sought to provide new meaning for federalism by replacing the classical idea of confederate republics with a modern principle of territorially divided sovereign power drawn from the experience of feudal monarchy, but intended to be adaptable to the needs of various situations including large commercial nations. Anglo-Gothic constitutionalism is neither a universal blueprint for constitutional design, nor a call for particular reforms. Rather it is a set of general principles drawn from concrete historical regimes intended to reveal the range of possibilities available to modern peoples concerned with securing moderate government. Montesquieu's endorsement of a new understanding of federalism, no less than his support for the separation of powers, is thus, perhaps, best understood as an intrinsically flexible and pragmatic response to what he took to be the dangerous centralizing tendencies in the prevailing notions of sovereignty. To the legislator's ''spirit of moderation'' (29.1.602) this account of British and Gothic constitutionalism adds the rational imperative not only to calculate the ''distribution of the three powers'' of government, but also to consider how the organization of society in a vertical arrangement of territorially divided jurisdictions with primary localities and a national center may be utilized to protect liberty in nations with the suitable geographic or historic conditions.
Montesquieu's complex legacy in the history of federal theory is a product of both the context and text of the Spirit of the Laws. His mature thoughts on federalism have suffered considerable neglect due not only to their placement in the closing books of a massive and confusing work, but also due to the relative obscurity of the discussion of French constitutional history in which his federalist teaching appears. While this notoriously dense and seemingly disorganized work may have appeared to Voltaire and others as a ''labyrinth without a thread'' (Shklar 1987, 114) , Montesquieu insists in the Preface that there is a ''design of the work'' (xliii). However, he also admits that this overarching design is by no means obvious and he cautions the reader not to judge individual discussions such as that of federal republics in Book 9 or England in Books 11 and 19 out of context of the general plan of the work. Montesquieu defends this elaborate presentation in terms of a hermeneutical principle by which authorial intent is not a question of making the reader read, ''but of making him think'' (11.20.186) .
The closing books of the Spirit of the Laws that deal with Montesquieu's federalism are, perhaps, the most impenetrable section of the work. At one point Montesquieu even begs the reader's pardon for the ''deadly boredom' ' (30.15.639) of the lengthy discussion of obscure French legal history. However, he justifies this as a tedious but legitimate intervention into the longstanding and fiercely partisan debate about French constitutional history which he claims typically reduced to conspiracies to deprive the people and the nobility, respectively of their rightful place in the French constitutional order (Cox 2001, 411 ). Montesquieu's argument for federalism flows out of the context of this historiographical debate in which he tries to demonstrate that the medieval French Constitution was an evolution of the original simple Frankish government into the more complex system of moderate monarchy with intermediate institutions and territorially divided sovereign power. Unfortunately, in this context, the discussion is easily mistaken to be a piece d'occasion of eighteenth-century French polemics with little or no relevance to broader constitutional theory. Moreover, Montesquieu's tortuous design may also have been due to the threat of censorship still very much a concern to French authors of the period (Cox 2001, 419) . 16 While the Spirit of the Laws was unsparing in its criticism of the Church and promptly placed on the Index for this indiscretion, Montesquieu was much more cautious about being perceived to be openly advocating any political reforms that would offend the French monarchy. Hence, the radical potential of his reflections on federalism toward the end of the work is decidedly muted. However, in the general design of the work there is an underlying and consistent critique of Bourbon absolutism. The regime analysis in Part I can be seen as Montesquieu's effort to define monarchy narrowly and solidify its association with the very intermediary institutions that the Bourbons were in the process of destroying (Shklar 1990, 265-266) . The discussions of England in Parts II and III deepen the critique of French absolutism. In his indirect approach, Montesquieu's praise of England's separation of powers and system of representation is implicit criticism of France. Despite his protestations to the contrary (xliii, 11.6.166), any reader enchanted by the account of England, cannot help but feel resentment toward the Bourbons. In the closing part following the treatment of commerce and religion, Montesquieu returns to the issue of constitutional design and suggests an important supplement to the separation of powers by expanding on the principle of regionalism in the medieval French constitution. The virtue of Montesquieu's indirect approach to developing his federalist teaching was that it allowed him to do so in a way that did not alarm the authorities. However, the disadvantage of his perhaps excessive caution is that the full effect of Montesquieu's innovative federal theory is often lost in the intricate folds of argument woven throughout the work.
These issues of text and context had an important impact on the way the Spirit of the Laws was received and interpreted by later commentators. In America, during the period of constitutional formation in the 1780's Montesquieu was arguably the most celebrated authority by Federalists and Anti-federalists alike (Lutz 1984, 192, 195) . Anti-federalists turned to Montesquieu's discussion of classical republicanism to support their contention that democracy is incompatible with large territories (Shklar 1990, 274) . While Federalists rejected the small republic argument, they embraced Montesquieu's account of the separation of powers as a touchstone for constitutional design both in the national and first state constitutions (Madison et al. 2001, 250-252; Ward 2004, 406-417) . Each side in the early American constitutional debate took what they wanted from the Spirit of the Laws, or rejected its authority when Montesquieu's argument appeared to contradict their view, but neither side showed much interest in the closing books on French constitutional history.
The response in Britain also focused on aspects of the Spirit of the Laws that appeared most germane to the nation's constitutional identity. The account of the separation of powers in 11.6 became inseparable from the British understanding of their system of government, especially after Blackstone practically codified Montesquieu's observations and the orthodoxy of parliamentary sovereignty became not only the governing philosophy of Britain but also the organizing principle of the empire. While Montesquieu's illumination of the principles of parliamentary sovereignty was universally praised, his concern about executive corruption of the legislature set him at odds with important elements of the English political nation including the ascendant Court Whigs and such luminaries as David Hume who defended executive influence as necessary for preserving constitutional balance (Hume 1985, 42-46) . 17 As with the Americans, few in Britain paid any attention to the federal dimension in the closing books of the Spirit of the Laws. In a work of such extraordinary breadth, it is, perhaps, not surprising that commentators often only saw what was of immediate interest to them. In contrast, the closing books of the Spirit of the Laws were crucial for later commentators in France. Indeed, the impact on French readers depended largely on their views about the nation's constitutional history (Shklar 1987, 113) . While Montesquieu was not without important admirers such as Lally-Tolendal, the Spirit of the Laws met with harsh criticism from the most influential segment of French intellectuals. To Voltaire and Helvétius, Montesquieu's praise for Gothic constitutionalism displayed a perspective that was too attached to feudalism and aristocratic privilege to provide any meaningful path to reform. Rousseau's criticism of Montesquieu's pragmatism and disdain for his celebration of parliamentary representation further contributed to his association with conservatism (Rousseau 1988, 143-144; Shklar 1990, 269) . Inasmuch as many French commentators found Montesquieu's apparent commitment to feudalism antiquated, his complex federal theory was tainted by its perceived connection with a largely discredited order. His moderate constitutionalism appeared increasingly anachronistic as the revolutionary movement, following the lead of Condorcet and Sieyes, embraced the notion of simple unitary government as the only way to reflect the national will. The revolutionary desire to abolish feudalism tout court made federalism practically synonymous with counterrevolution and reaction (Baker 1987, 353) . Arguably what was lost in this process was any sense that Montesquieu's idea of federalism drawn from the experience of feudalism could be adapted to the context of constitutional monarchy or republicanism in the modern commercial regime.
Montesquieu's ''spirit of legislation'' was neither a throwback to medievalism nor an explicit program for radical political change. Rather, his reflections on English and French constitutionalism suggest patterns for practical application of moderate principles calibrated to the context of existing historical and cultural conditions. For eighteenth-century Britain, one can reasonably deduce from the text and general design of the Spirit of the Laws encouragement of parliamentary devolution of powers to local and regional authorities as a means to balance the concentration of power in the central government. With respect to Bourbon France, constitutional reform along Anglo-Gothic lines may include a policy to revivify local institutions and to establish a representative national legislature, perhaps resembling a more popular version of the historic Estates-General, in order to balance the power of the crown. Clearly French reformers in the Montesquieuian mold would have much more to do than their British counterparts, and have to do it while trying to manage the antagonistic crosscurrents of concentrated power in a representative national government, on the one hand, and the countervailing devolution of power to provincial assemblies, on the other. The tumultuous demise of the Bourbon monarchy in the French Revolution perhaps demonstrated the immense difficulty in controlling forces for change that could not be channeled through the institutions of the ancien regime. On the basis of his treatment of English and French constitutional history and development, one suspects Montesquieu would have feared as much.
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